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ABSTRACT 
For years, considerations of the relationship between international 
human rights standards and the work of forensic psychologists have focused 
on the role of organized psychology in prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay 
and Abu Ghirab. That issue has been widely discussed and debated, and 
these discussions show no sign of abating. But there has been virtually no 
attention given to another issue of international human rights, one that 
grows in importance each year: how the treatment (especially, the 
institutional treatment) of persons with mental and intellectual disabilities 
violates international human rights law, and the silence of organized 
forensic psychology in the face of this mistreatment. This issue has become 
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even more pointed in recent years, following the ratification of the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
Organized forensic psychology has remained largely silent about the 
potential significance of this Convention and about how it demands that we 
rethink the way we institutionalize persons – often in brutal and barbaric 
conditions – around the world. In many parts of the world, circumstances 
are bleak: services are provided in segregated settings that cut people off 
from society, often for life; persons are arbitrarily detained from society 
and committed to institutions without any modicum of due process; 
individuals are denied the ability to make choices about their lives when 
they are put under plenary guardianship; there is a wide-spread denial of 
appropriate medical care or basic hygiene in psychiatric facilities, 
individuals are subject to powerful and often-dangerous psychotropic 
medications without adequate standards, and there is virtually no human 
rights oversight and enforcement mechanisms to protect against the broad 
range of institutional abuse. Although there is a robust literature developing 
– interestingly, mostly in Australia and New Zealand, but little in the US – 
about how such institutional conditions violate the international human 
rights of this population, virtually nothing has been written about how 
organized forensic psychology has been silent about these abuses. 
In this paper, I (1) discuss the relevant international human rights law 
that applies to these questions, (2) examine the current state of conditions 
in institutions worldwide, (3) argue why forensic psychology needs to 
become more aggressively involved in this area, and (4) offer some 
suggestions as to how this situation can be ameliorated. 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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INTRODUCTION 
For years, the focus of how international human rights standards should 
govern forensic psychology has been organized  around psychology’s 
impact on and response to prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib.1 That focus has not been substantially changed as discussions and 
debates on that issue show no sign of abating.2 In contrast, scant attention 
 
 
1 Kenneth S. Pope, The Code Not Taken: The Path from Guild Ethics to Torture and Our Continuing 
Choices, 57 CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 51 (2016). This is not the first example of such focus. See, e.g., Bruce 
E. Levine, 10 of the Worst Abuses of the Psychiatric and Psychological Professions in American History, 
ALTERNET.ORG (Sept. 24, 2015, 1:31 PM GMT), http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/10-worst-
abuses-psychiatric-and-psychological-professions-american-history; see also, E.W., How America's 
Psychologists Ended up Endorsing Torture, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/07/terror-torture-and-psychology. 
“Forensic psychology” is defined broadly in the SPECIALTY GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC 
PSYCHOLOGY (AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 2013) [hereinafter SPECIALTY GUIDELINES] as 
“professional practice by psychologists, within any subdiscipline of psychology (e.g., clinical, 
developmental, social, experimental) when [] engaged regularly as [forensic psychologists].” Comm. on 
Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 655, 656-57 (1991) [hereinafter Specialty Guidelines].          
Specifically, the SPECIALTY GUIDELINES elaborate that forensic psychology means “all forms of 
professional psychological conduct when acting, with definable foreknowledge, as a psychological 
expert on explicitly psycholegal issues, in direct assistance to courts, parties to legal proceedings, 
correctional and forensic mental health facilities, and administrative, judicial and legislative agencies 
acting in an adjudicative capacity.” Id. at 657.  
“Organized psychology” is generally meant to reflect the positions of the American Psychological 
Association (“APA”). See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme 
Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1579 
(1992). On organized psychology’s role in judicial policy-making in general, see, e.g., Charles R. 
Tremper, Organized Psychology's Efforts to Influence Judicial Policy-Making, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
496 (1987).  
This paper will focus on (1) those who work in correctional and psychiatric institutions (both 
forensic and civil), (2) those who give testimony in forensic cases, and (3) those who do research on 
topics that relate to the work of forensic psychologists. 
2 E.g., Ivan Greenberg, From Surveillance to Torture: The Evolution of US Interrogation Policies 
During the War on Terror, 28 SECURITY J. 165 (2015); John Bohannon, Torture Report Prompts APA 
Apology: Admitting it Colluded with U.S. Psychologists Group to Change Policies, Leadership, 349 
SCIENCE 221 (2015); Roy Eidelson, Heart of Darkness: Observations on a Torture Notebook, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Jan. 04, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dangerous-ideas/201701/heart-
darkness-observations-torture-notebook; Roy Eidelson, Psychologists Are Facing Consequences for 
Helping With Torture. It’s Not Enough., WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/psychologists-are-facing-consequences-for-helping-with-
torture-its-not-enough/2017/10/13/2756b734-ad14-11e7-9e58-
e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.e9f17acc7291; Greg Miller, CIA Documents Expose Internal 
Agency Feud over Psychologists Leading Interrogation Program, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-documents-expose-internal-agency-feud-
over-psychologists-leading-interrogation-program/2017/01/18/a73bd722-dd85-11e6-918c-
99ede3c8cafa_story.html?pushid=breaking-news_1484838323&tid=notifi_push_breaking-
news&utm_term=.c653e9523030. 
See generally David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 
100 GEO. L.J. 823 (2012). 
Two of the psychologists in question are currently on trial as part of litigation stemming from these 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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has been paid to potential international human rights violations of persons 
with mental or intellectual disabilities at forensic institutions,3 and this 
silence of organized forensic psychology facing this mistreatment is equally 
disturbing. In light of the ratification of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”),4 the problem is more 
pointed that organized forensic psychology still largely remains silent about 
how this significant Convention demands rethinking the humanitarian 
principles that must control the ways we seek to institutionalize persons 
around the world.5 In reality, circumstances in many parts of the world are 
bleak: services are provided in segregated settings that cut people off from 
society, often for life;6 persons are arbitrarily detained from society and 
 
 
activities. See, e.g., Carol Rosenberg, Torture Lawsuit Against Two Psychologists Delays CIA 
Waterboarders’ Guantánamo Testimony, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 4, 2017, 9:24 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/article165607327.html. 
It is certainly likely that this debate will be reinvigorated by the statements of the new President that he 
supports the enhanced use of waterboarding. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump Touts 
Waterboarding, Stokes Immigration Fears in Border State, CNN.COM (last updated Oct. 31, 2016, 12:29 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/30/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-immigration-criticism 
(“These savages are chopping off heads, drowning people. This is medieval times and then we can't do 
waterboarding? ‘It's far too tough,’” [Donald] Trump said, mocking critics of the technique used by the 
CIA in interrogations of terror suspects under President George W. Bush’s post-9/11 administration). 
See also, James E. Mitchell, Sorry, Mad Dog, Waterboarding Works, WALL ST. J. (last updated Dec. 9, 
2016, 8:29 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sorry-mad-dog-waterboarding-works-1481242339 
(author had been contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency to help put together what became its 
“enhanced-interrogation program”); Jenna Johnson, Trump Says ‘Torture Works,’ Backs Waterboarding 
and ‘Much Worse,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-
torture-works-backs-waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-11e5-b195-
2e29a4e13425_story.html?utm_term=.849e79618497.  
In 2015, the APA officially “apologize[d] for this stain on our collective integrity.” See KENNETH 
S.  POPE, FIVE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN ETHICS IN ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS:  EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES INFORMED BY RESEARCH AND HISTORY 11 (2018). 
3 E.g., Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command”: 
Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the Perspectives of 
International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. GOV’T  L. REV. 381 (2015); Michael L. 
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “The Distant Ships of Liberty”: Why Criminology Needs to Take Seriously 
International Human Rights Laws that Apply to Persons with Disabilities (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692109;  Michael L. Perlin, International Human 
Rights and Institutional Forensic Psychiatry: The Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE MEASURES IN 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CARE - LEGAL, ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES  9 (Birgit Völlm & 
Norbert Nedopil eds., 2016). 
4 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN 
THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (Ronald Roesch ed., 2012). President Obama signed the Convention in 2009, 
but the Senate failed to ratify it. Nonetheless, signatories must refrain from acts which would defeat the 
Convention's purposes. See infra note 44. 
5 Some argue that the CRPD bars all involuntary institutionalization. For a discussion, see George 
Szmukler et al., Mental Health Law and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
37 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 245 (2014). 
6 See Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the 
Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 
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committed to institutions without any modicum of due process;7 individuals 
are denied the ability to make choices about their lives when they are put 
under plenary guardianship, also often known as “civil death”;8 there is a 
wide-spread denial of appropriate medical care or basic hygiene in 
psychiatric facilities,9 individuals are subject to powerful and often 
dangerous psychotropic medications without adequate standards,10 and 
there is almost no human rights oversight or enforcement mechanisms to 
protect against the broad range of institutional abuse.11 Although there is a 
robust literature developing–mostly in Australia and New Zealand–on how 
such institutional conditions violate the international human rights of this 
population,12 organized forensic psychology has virtually been silent about 
these abuses in the United States. 
 
 
999, 1005 (2000) (“The history of psychiatric institutions in the United States has been one of 
institutional segregation”). 
7 See Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-Based Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social 
Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 447 (2007) 
(… Internationally, there is a shameful history of human rights abuses in psychiatric 
institutions: the provision of services in a segregated setting that cuts people off from society, 
often for life; the arbitrary detention from society that takes place when people are committed 
to institutions without due process; the denial of people's ability to make choices about their 
lives when they are put under plenary guardianship; the denial of appropriate medical care or 
basic hygiene in psychiatric facilities; the practice of subjecting people to powerful and 
dangerous psychotropic medications without adequate standards; and the lack of human rights 
oversight and enforcement mechanisms to protect against the broad range of abuses in 
institutions.) 
8 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 1159, 1162-63 (2013) (discussing Oliver Lewis, New Project on Reforming Guardianship 
in Russia, MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR. (Aug. 11, 2009), http://bit.ly/Xd7qR3). 
9 See Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You That Hide Behind Walls”: The Relationship 
between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention Against Torture 
and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN HEALTH- CARE SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE’S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT, 195, 203 (2013) [hereinafter 
TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT]. 
10 See Juan E. Mendez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment), Rep. on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013). 
11 See generally Perlin & Schriver, supra note 3; Perlin, supra note 3; Perlin & Schriver, supra 
note 9. As I discuss below, I believe that is imperative that, in many cases, forensic psychologists 
consider the impact of institutional conditions on their ultimate conclusions. See infra text accompanying 
note 141. 
12 See, e.g., Tony Ward & Astrid Birgden, Human Rights and Correctional Clinical Practice, 12 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 628, 629 (2007); Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, “Tolling for the 
Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights 
Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 231 (2008); Kris Gledhill, Human Rights Instruments and Mental Health Law: The English 
Experience of the Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L 
L. & COM. 359 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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This article will first briefly introduce the controversy enveloped in 
organized psychology for the past fifteen years. Part I discusses the relevant 
international human rights law that applies to violations against persons 
with mental and intellectual disabilities. Part II examines the current state 
of conditions in mental health institutions worldwide. Part III argues why 
forensic psychology needs to become more aggressively involved in 
countering international human rights violations at these institutions. Part 
IV explains the significance of understanding sanism and pretextuality in 
dealing with the underlying presumptions of forensic psychologists’ 
behaviors and explains how the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence can 
ameliorate the situation. Part V concludes the article by advocating for 
changes in forensic psychology to embrace international human rights 
mandates. 
The title of this article comes from Bob Dylan’s anthemic early song, 
The Times They Are A-Changing, characterized by the critic Howard 
Soames as “a rallying call ... as America raced through momentous 
changes,”13 and by the critic Robert Shelton as “a timeless dialogue between 
those restrained by old ways and those daring something new.”14 In this 
song, Dylan challenged everyone–parents, politicians, and citizens–to “get 
out of the new [road] if [they] can’t lend [a] hand” because “[t]he [old] order 
is rapidly fadin.’”15 And in the same couplet, he sings, “[The] old road is 
rapidly agin.’”16  He had that absolutely right in 1963–in the time of the 
glory of the American civil rights movement–when he wrote that song.17 
But I think his admonition is just as valid for us today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 HOWARD SOUNES, DOWN THE HIGHWAY: THE LIFE OF BOB DYLAN 145 (2001).  
14 ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN (Da Capo ed. 
1997). See also, Michael L. Perlin, The Times They Are A-Changin,’ in ENCOUNTERS WITH BOB DYLAN: 
IF YOU SEE HIM, SAY HELLO 29 (Tracy Johnson ed., 2000). 
15 Bob Dylan, The Times They Are A-Changin,’ BOB DYLAN, 
http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/times-they-are-changin/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).   
16 Id. 
17 Sadly, Dylan has not sung it since August 14, 2009. See id., I have not seen him sing it in person 
since November 13, 2002. See Michael Perlin, Reviews, BOBLINKS.COM, 
http://boblinks.com/111302r.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). 
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I. THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW18 
A. Recent Developments in International Human Rights Standard’s 
Impact on Forensic Psychology 
The attention to behavioral standards of forensic psychologists and 
forensic psychiatrists has been rising dramatically in recent years. This new 
attention mostly flows from revelations of the Bush Administration’s 
sanctioning torture at prison camps in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.19 
This led to a spirited debate on the application of international human rights 
to what some psychologists and psychiatrists have done in the context of 
armed conflict. In the words of Kenneth Pope, in his recent “Member of the 
Year” address to the Canadian Psychological Association: “the torture 
controversy and the choices that led up to it provide a grim inventory of 
guild ethics, willful ignorance, denial, and discrediting critics.”20 
The American Psychological Association’s (“APA”) failure to mandate 
that psychologists adhere to international human rights standards21 has been 
sharply criticized.22 Among these critics is the NGO Physicians for Human 
Rights (“PHR”). “PHR was founded on the idea that physicians, scientists, 
and other health professionals possess unique skills that lend significant 
credibility to the investigation and documentation of human rights abuses[;] 
[it uses its] specialized expertise … to advocate for persecuted health 
workers, prevent torture, document mass atrocities, and hold those who 
violate human rights accountable.”23 Along with other NGOs such as 
 
 
18 Portions of this section draw on Perlin & Lynch, supra note 3, and Perlin, supra note 3. 
19 See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 
(2004); THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
eds., 2005); THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL 
AND THE PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (Steven Strasser ed., 2004); STEVEN  
H. MILES, OATH BETRAYED: AMERICA’S TORTURE DOCTORS (2nd ed., 2009). Apparently, forensic 
psychologists did participate at Guantanamo Bay. See Stephen Soldz, Healers or Interrogators: 
Psychology and the United States Torture Regime, 18 PSYCHOANALYTIC DIALOGUES  592, 592-600 
(2008). They have been accused of prisoner abuse in other cases involving national security matters. See 
Jeffrey Kaye, Former Top Navy Psychologist Involved in Pre-9/11 Prisoner Abuse Case, PUB. REC. 
(July 24, 2009), http://pubrecord.org/special-to-the-public-record/2722/former-psychologist-involved-
pre-911/. For a comprehensive explanation of what is torture in this context, see INT’L REHABILITATION 
COUNCIL FOR TORTURE VICTIMS, What We Do/Torture Rehabilitation, http://www.irct.org/what-is-
torture/defining-torture.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
20 Pope, supra note 1, at 56.  
21 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 9 (2005), 
http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/pens.pdf. 
22 See Cyrus Ahalt et al., Examining the Role of Healthcare Professionals in the Use of Solitary 
Confinement, BRIT. MED. J., Oct. 24, 2017, at j4657 (“The APA’s misplaced loyalty to the state directly 
undermined the health and human rights of patients at Guantanamo Bay”). 
23  PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., About PHR, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/about/ (last 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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Amnesty International, PHR sent an open letter to APA about what it termed 
APA’s “‘grievous mismanagement of this issue’; APA’s ‘providing ethical 
cover for psychologists’ participation in detainee abuse; [and] APA’s 
handling of the detainee interrogation issue creating ‘the greatest ethical 
crisis’ in the profession’s history and making a ‘terrible stain on the 
reputation of American psychology.’”24 Then, in 2015, PHR subsequently 
sent a letter to the APA leadership, encouraging the association to adopt a 
ban on psychologists’ participation in interrogations and any activities that 
do not comply with obligations under the U.N. Convention against 
Torture—to which the U.S. is a signatory25—including the use of sleep 
deprivation, prolonged isolation, and sensory deprivation.26 
It is important to underscore that “torture” goes beyond prototypical 
notions of physical abuse and includes psychological abuse as well.27 In this 
context, it is also important to note in some jurisdictions–especially, but not 
solely, in Eastern and Central Europe and China, and some in the United 
States–the existence of a sorry and shoddy history of mental health 
professionals complying with governmental officials seeking to suppress 
political dissenters.28 So this should not be seen as merely a one-time 
aberration.29 
This all leads to a critical question: should international human rights 
law only function to prevent politically motivated torture in forensic 
psychology and forensic psychiatry, or should international human rights 
law have a boarder mandate that governs forensic psychologists and 
psychiatrists’ general behaviors in all contexts? 
I speak often to psychiatrists, psychologists, and criminologists about 
international human rights law and its relationship to mental disability law, 
 
 
visited Oct.20, 2017).  
24 Kenneth S. Pope, Are the American Psychological Association’s Detainee Interrogation Policies 
Ethical and Effective?: Key Claims, Documents, and Results, 219 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE 150, 
153 (2011). 
25 See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
26 PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., PHR Urges Ban on Psychologists’ Participation in Interrogations: 
Toronto Meeting Provides Opportunity for Key Ethics Reforms (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-releases/phr-urges-ban-on-psychologists-participation-
in-interrogations.html. 
27 See generally THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE (Almerindo E. Ojeda ed., 1st ed., 
2008); Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT’L. REV. RED 
CROSS 591 (2007). 
28 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability 
Law: The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69, 71-
81 (2006).   
29 Id. 
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and remained stunned by the few audience members in the United States 
who are familiar with this relationship, and the even fewer who are familiar 
with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This 
differs sharply from my experiences abroad: whether I am lecturing in a 
nation with a developed economy or a developing economy, virtually every 
audience member is familiar with this body of law.30 
Why is this? The reason may be as benignly simple as the fragmentation 
of scholarly research agendas (that, simply, different cohorts of scholars 
have chosen to write about the different aspects of this connection), an 
explanation that appears to be supported by the astonishing paucity of 
available legal literature in this area. Or, perhaps it is as darkly complex as 
the reality that this topic is just not of much interest to the main cohorts of 
individuals whom we most logically might expect to embrace it: 
international human rights activists, academically-focused forensic 
psychologists and forensic psychiatrists, and mental disability law scholars. 
In this context, it is necessary to recall that it was not until January 2002 
that Amnesty International acknowledged, albeit grudgingly, that violations 
of international human rights law in the cases of persons institutionalized in 
psychiatric facilities were international human rights violations.31 I am 
 
 
30 In recent years, I have turned my scholarly and pedagogic attention toward the relationship 
between international human rights law and mental disability law. I have lectured on this topic frequently 
both in the United States and abroad. I have also created a course on the topic that I have taught in full 
at New York Law School, at the Institute of Human Rights at Abo Akademi University in Turku, 
Finland, at the Global Law Institute of Haifa University in Israel, at Bond University in the Gold Coast, 
Australia, and, in part, at universities in Taiwan, Indonesia, Uganda, and New Zealand. This course is 
now available as a web-based course through the Global Institute of Forensic Research. Further, I have 
published a casebook in this area, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Michael L. Perlin ed., 1st ed. 2006), 
have written multiple law review articles and book chapters, see, e.g., Perlin & Schriver, supra note 9; 
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”: Sexuality, International 
Human Rights, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 J. CAN. J. COMP. & CONTEMP. L. 9 (2015); Michael 
L. Perlin, "The Ladder of the Law Has No Top and No Bottom": How Therapeutic Jurisprudence Can 
Give Life to International Human Rights, 37 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 535 (2014); Michael L. Perlin, 
“Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The International Human Rights and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013); 
Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection between International Human Rights and Mental 
Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND 
JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Heather Y. Bersot, eds. 2014), and an expository book, see 
PERLIN, supra note 4. I have also focused on the relationship between international human rights law 
and mental disability law in advocacy training work that I have done, literally, on every continent where 
there is an organized body of law. See Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-Based Mental Disability Law 
Program: Implications for Social Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 30 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 435 (2007) [hereinafter Perlin, Social Change]; Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law 
and Comparative Mental Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM 333, 
334 n.8 (2007) [hereinafter Perlin, Universal Factors]. 
31 See, e.g., Krassimir Kanev, State, Human Rights, and Mental Health in Bulgaria, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 444 n. 21 (2002). I discuss the implications of this in Michael L. Perlin & Éva 
Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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forced to conclude that the question at the heart of this article—the 
relationship between international human rights standards and the 
institutional work of forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists 
(especially, but certainly not exclusively, the work that takes place in the 
psychiatric institutions of civil law nations)—is one that is essentially 
ignored by academics, both as a topic of scholarly discourse, and as a topic 
of classroom study.32 
I find this pathetic. I also find it baffling, given the shameful history of 
human rights abuses in psychiatric institutions on every continent.33  A 
series of reports issued over the past twenty years by Mental Disabilities 
Rights International (“MDRI,” now Disabilities Rights International, 
“DRI”) and the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (“MDAC”) excoriating 
the governments of numerous Central and Eastern European and Central 
and South American nations34 have drawn scholars and policymakers to 
these issues,35 and have even had an impact on the political process of 
European Union accession.36 Furthermore, there has even been some 
 
 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 80, 82 (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 
2012). See also, Theresa Degener, Disability Rights Are Human Rights, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 
(May 9, 2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/disability-rights-are-human-rights. 
32 On the relationship between international human rights law and mental disability law in general, 
see, e.g., Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy Under the 
“Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993); 
Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 527-31 (2002). 
33 See, e.g., PERLIN ET AL., supra note 31, ch. 1; Perlin, supra note 28; Michael L. Perlin, “Chimes 
of Freedom:” International Human Rights and Institutional Mental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
INT'L & COMP. L. 423, 424 (2002); Perlin, Social Change, supra note 30, at 447. 
34 For early reports see, e.g., MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL 
HEALTH: URUGUAY (1995) (hereinafter MDRI URUGUAY REPORT); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS 
INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997) (hereinafter MDRI HUNGARY 
REPORT); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH: MEXICO (2000) 
(hereinafter MDRI MEXICO REPORT); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT’L, NOT ON THE AGENDA: 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN KOSOVO (2003) (hereinafter MDRI KOSOVO 
REPORT); Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Paper, Practice, 
Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293 (2002). 
35 See, e.g., Sheila Wildeman, Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global 
Mental Health Policy in Light of the Convention on The Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 41 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 48, 66 n.75 (2013); Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under International Law, 25 GA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 527, 561 n.139 (2009); Michael Ashley Stein, China and Disability Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 17 n.74 (2010); Debra Benko & Brittany Benowitz, The Application of 
Universal Human Rights Law to People with Mental Disabilities, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 36; Vandana 
Peterson, Understanding Disability Under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
its Impact on International Refugee and Asylum Law, 42 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 687 (2014). 
36 In the Czech Republic, researchers—led by officials of the MDAC—found “cases of individuals, 
including young children, kept in cage beds for practically the entire day—every day—except when they 
needed to use the toilet.” MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CENTER, PRESS RELEASE, MDAC CALLS 
FOR CAGE BED BAN IN CZECH REPUBLIC, PRAGUE AND BUDAPEST (November 24, 2003), reprinted in 
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coverage in the mainstream media.37  
So, ignorance on the part of forensic mental health professionals can no 
longer be—if it ever were—an acceptable excuse. Moreover, I expect that 
the widespread professional disregard of this issue depressingly and banally 
results from what I call sanism and pretextuality.38 This, though, does not 
solve the problem; it merely identifies the cause. And we will blind 
ourselves if we fail to acknowledge the ways that sanism and pretextuality 
have served as potent counterweights to the application of human rights law 
to all institutional mental disability law.39 
B. The meaning of human rights 
What are human rights?40  The University of Minnesota-based Human 
Rights Resource Center provides a simple definition: “[h]uman rights are 
the rights a person has simply because he or she is a human being.”41  In its 
Preamble, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world.42  The World Health Organization adds to the description 
by stating that human rights consist of the basic entitlement accorded to 
 
 
PERLIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 867. These practices were subsequently decried by a member of the 
European Parliament who demanded abandonment of the use of such beds as a prerequisite for the Czech 
Republic’s admission to the European Union. Id. (quoting Member of Parliament John Bowls). 
37 See, e.g., Craig S. Smith, Abuse of Mentally Ill Is Reported in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/28/world/europe/abuse-of-mentally-ill-is-reported-in-
turkey.html; Craig S. Smith, Romania's Orphans Face Widespread Abuse, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/world/europe/10iht-romania.html. 
38 “Sanism” is an irrational prejudice in many ways like racism, sexism, or homophobia. 
“Pretextuality” defines how courts accept testimonial dishonesty by expert witnesses. See infra text 
accompanying notes 102-14 (defining and explaining terms). I have written about how these factors 
contaminate the relationship between mental disability law and international human rights law in 
Michael L. Perlin, “A Change Is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability 
Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 487 (2009).  
39 See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 4, at 33-37; Perlin, supra note 28, at 89-91. 
Beyond the scope of this article is an inquiry into the ways in which certain state-employed forensic 
psychologists regularly testify in support of “ethnic adjustments” to IQ scores so as to make defendants 
with intellectual disabilities eligible for the death-penalty violate international human rights law. See 
Michael L. Perlin, “Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind”: Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
the Use of “Ethnic Adjustments” in Death Penalty Cases of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities, 
65 AM. U. L. REV. 1437 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin, Your Corrupt Ways] (discussing this issue in the 
context of domestic constitutional law).  
40 See generally PERLIN ET AL., supra note 30, ch. 3. 
41 UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., What Are Human Rights?, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE 
AND NOW: CELEBRATING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/whatare.htm (last visited Oct. 
20, 2017). 
42 G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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every human being.  These rights include the right to health, education, 
shelter, employment, property, food, freedom of expression, and 
movement.43 
Consider the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”).44 The CRPD “is regarded as having finally empowered the 
‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their rights, and to participate in 
international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who have 
achieved specific treaty recognition and protection.”45 This Convention is 
the most revolutionary international human rights document ever applied to 
persons with disabilities.46  The CRPD furthers the human rights approach 
to disability and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality 
in almost every aspect of life.47  It firmly endorses a social model of 
disability, which is a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that 
traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law.48 “The 
Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability within a social 
model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to 
all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons 
with disabilities.”49 It provides a framework for ensuring that mental health 
 
 
43 See, e.g., World Health Assembly Res. 23.41, 15th plen. mtg. (May 21, 1970), reprinted in 1 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HANDBOOK OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD 
HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXECUTIVE BOARD 501 (1973); G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, 25, 26 (Dec. 10, 1984). See also, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya 
Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2009). 
44 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (CRPD). 
The following section largely draws on material in Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless 
Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257, 
273-74 (2014), and Perlin, supra note 8, at 1173-74. “Although the United States has not ratified the 
CRPD, ‘a state’s obligations under it are controlled by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] 
which requires signatories ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat [the Disability Convention's] object 
and purpose.’” Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with 
Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 362-63 
(2011). 
45 Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, All His Sexless Patients, supra note 44, at  273-74 (2014). See also, 
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).  See, e.g., Louise Arbour, High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Oral Statement at Special Event: Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Its Optional Protocol 26 March 2007, Human Rights Council, United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/docshrc.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). See generally Kristin 
Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 134-37 (2012). 
46 See Perlin & Szeli, supra note 31; PERLIN, supra note 4, at 3-21.   
47 See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 38, 492-93. 
48 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”:  The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the 
Intersection between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 138-41 (2011). 
49 Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to 
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 249, 256 (2009).  For additional research 
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laws “fully recognise the rights of those with mental illness.”50  There is no 
question that the Convention has “ushered in a new era of disability rights 
policy.”51 
This Convention demands that we reconsider the issues discussed in this 
article.52 In light of Convention articles mandating, inter alia, "respect for 
inherent dignity,"53 and the elimination of discrimination in all matters 
related to interpersonal relationships,54 it is time for a radical change of 
perspective and attitude in how society views the institutionalization of 
persons with disabilities.55 The CRPD is unique because it is the first legally 
binding instrument devoted to the comprehensive protection of the rights of 
persons with disabilities.56 It not only clarifies that States should not 
 
 
on how the CRPD fits within a social framework, see Janet E. Lord et al., Lessons From the Experience 
of U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in 
Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564, 568-69 (2010); H. Archibald Kaiser, Canadian 
Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 163-64 
(2009); Ronald McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Some Reflections (Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 10/30, Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1563883. 
50 Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW 
CONTEXT: A SOCIO-LEGAL J. 1, 8 (2008). 
51 Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2011). On how  
international human rights courts and commissions have begun to use international human rights 
standards in cases brought on behalf of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities, see, e.g., Matter 
of Victor Rosario Congo, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 12/971, 
OEA/Ser/L/VII.102, doc. 36 (1999), discussed, inter alia, in Perlin, Social Change, supra note 30, at 
447-48; Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/01, Decision, African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (2003), 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/33rd/comunications/241.01/achpr33_241_01_eng.pdf, discussed, 
inter alia, in Perlin, supra note 48, at 137. See also, Lance Gable et al., Mental Health and Due Process 
in the Americas: Protecting the Human Rights of Persons Involuntarily Admitted to and Detained in 
Psychiatric Institutions, 18 PAN. AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 366 (2005); Alison A. Hillman, Human Rights 
and Deinstitutionalization: A Success Story in the Americas, 18 PAN. AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 374 (2005); 
Jonathan Bindman et al., The Human Rights Act and Mental Health Legislation, 182 BRITISH. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 91 (2003). 
52 See generally Perlin & Lynch, supra note 3. 
53 CRPD, supra note 44, art. 3. On how dignity is the first “fundamental axiom[]” upon which the 
Convention is premised, see Raymond Lang, The United Nations Convention on the Right and Dignities 
for Persons with Disabilities: A Panacea for Ending Disability Discrimination?, 3 ALTER EUR. J. 
DISABILITY 266, 273 (2009).  
54 CRPD, supra note 44, art. 23. 
55 Beyond the scope of this article is an inquiry into the extent to which cases articulating the 
constitutional rights of persons in psychiatric institutions (and facilities for persons with intellectual 
disabilities) in the United States comply with the CRPD and other international human rights 
conventions. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).  
56 See generally Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for 
a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.  1 (2012) (hereinafter Perlin, Promoting Social Change). See also, Michael 
L. Perlin et al., Creating a “Building a Disability Rights Information Center for Asia and the Pacific 
Clinic”: Of Pedagogy and Social Justice, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1 (2015); 
Michael L. Perlin & Mehgan Gallagher, Why a Disability Rights Tribunal Must be Premised on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]          HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS AND FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY           93 
 
 
 
 
discriminate against persons with disabilities, but also sets out explicitly the 
many steps that States must take to create an enabling environment so that 
persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society.57  
This leads to the next question: how does this all affect what forensic 
psychologists, moving forward, should do?  
II. CONDITIONS IN PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS WORLDWIDE  
The practice of mental disability law in many parts of the world today 
reveals a pattern and practice of ongoing abuses that is “reminiscent of the 
state of American mental health facilities thirty-five or more years ago.”58 
Early institutional rights cases in the United States revealed persistent and 
pervasive mistreatment of persons with mental disabilities.59 As recently as 
1958, state hospitals were characterized by the President of the APA as 
“bankrupt beyond remedy.”60 Three years later, a witness testified at a 
Congressional hearing that “[s]ome [state hospital] physicians I interviewed 
frankly admitted that the animals of nearby piggeries were better housed, 
fed and treated than many of the patients on their wards.”61 When the 
Chairman of the Legal Action Committee of the National Association of 
Retarded Children (now “The Arc.”) characterized the Pennhurst State 
 
 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles, 10 PSYCHOL. INJ. & L. 244 (2017).  
57 On the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil commitment 
laws to comply with Convention mandates, see Bryan Y. Lee, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with 
Developmental Disabilities, 44 COLUMBIA. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 393 (2011). See also, István Hoffman 
& György Könczei, Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons 
with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. 
REV. 143 (2010) (on the application of the CRPD to capacity issues); Kathryn D. DeMarco, Disabled 
by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of 
Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 523 (2012) (on the application of the CRPD to 
solitary confinement in correctional institutions). 
58 Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People with Mental Illness in 
Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 537, 
538 (2004).  
59 See, e.g., Perlin, Universal Factors, supra note 30, at 335; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER 
ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, ch. 7 (3d ed. 2016); Perlin, supra note 
48, at 121-22. 
60 Harry Solomon, Presidential Address: The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to 
American Psychiatry, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958). 
61 Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 40-42 (1961) (statement of Albert Deutsch). 
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School62 as “Dachau, without ovens,”63 there was never any accusation of 
exaggeration. 
This is not solely a domestic problem but one that exists worldwide. 
Consider the following, some examples of which I have previously 
characterized as “stupefying”:64    
1. Studies conducted at two Argentinean forensic wards showed 
unlivable conditions where individuals were housed in small, 
extremely overcrowded cells by approximately 75%, with no 
running water or toilets.  Many were denied routine medical 
care, a basic human right for all individuals regardless of legal 
status, and some were subjected to unwanted sexual practices 
and rape.  In extreme cases, there were no appropriate treatment 
facilities in which to release the patients, and some were housed 
in the facility for over twenty years, receiving no medication or 
other treatment.65 
2. Prison facilities in England revealed a number of discrepancies, 
including “the lack of treatment facilities, lack of a clear legal 
framework for treating prisoners with severe mental illness, 
inadequately designed prison health care wings, and 
considerable delays in hospital transfers.”66 
3. Convicted prisoners from a Budapest prison were used to “keep 
an eye on” patients housed in the nation’s only high security 
forensic psychiatric institution.  Many of the patients in the 
institution were deemed “high suicide risk.”  One can opine that 
the prisoners tasked with this responsibility were not given 
adequate training in the treatment of those with mental illnesses 
or disabilities, especially those in such vulnerable conditions, 
 
 
62 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding Developmental 
Disabilities Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010, was merely a federal/state grant program and that 
neither the right to treatment nor the least restrictive alternative sections of the bill of rights were 
enforceable in private action); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal relief in a right-to-community service case due to federalism 
concerns). 
63 LEOPOLD LIPPMANN & I. IGNANCY GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION: ANATOMY OF THE 
PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 17 (1973). 
64 Perlin, Universal Factors, supra note 30, at 354; see also, Perlin, A Change is Going to Come, 
supra note 38, at 492. 
65 MENTAL DISABILITY RTS. INT’L (“MDRI”), RUINED LIVES: SEGREGATION FROM SOCIETY IN 
ARGENTINA’S PSYCHIATRIC ASYLUMS; A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH IN 
ARGENTINA (2007). 
66 Tim Exworthy et al., Asserting Prisoners' Right to Health: Progressing beyond Equivalence, 63 
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 270 (2012). 
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begging the question of how appropriate care could be 
rendered.67 
4. In Kyrgyzstan, there are no statutory provisions to deal with cases 
of persons who are potentially incompetent to stand trial. As a 
result, persons with severe mental illness who are charged with 
crime have no opportunity to be treated in an effort to improve 
their condition so as to become competent to stand trial.68 
5. Many institutions use prolonged confinement as a way of 
managing or disciplining individuals deemed dangerous.  
Tamms Correctional Center in Illinois, for example, held a 
prisoner with a well-documented history of schizophrenia in 
solitary for nearly six years.69  While solitary conditions can be 
psychologically harmful to any individual, they are particularly 
damaging to one with a mental disability.  In fact, a federal judge 
once equated putting mentally ill prisoners in isolated 
confinement with “putting an asthmatic in a place with little 
air…”70 
6. Albanian law requires that individuals with mental disabilities 
who have been charged with criminal offenses be housed in 
prison units and must comply by all prison rules.  Some were 
institutionalized for five years before their conditions were re-
evaluated.71 
 
Conditions in forensic facilities72 thus continue to “violate the ‘decencies 
 
 
67 Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come,” supra note 38, at 492. 
68 MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOC. CTR., MENTAL HEALTH LAW OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION § 4.2.1 (2004), 
http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Mental%20Health%20Law%20of%20the%20Kyrgyz%
20Republic%20and%20its%20implementation.pdf. 
69 HUM. RTS. WATCH, MENTAL ILLNESS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND US PRISONS: HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/22/mental-illness-
human-rights-and-us-prisons. 
70 Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
71 Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come,” supra note 38, at 492 n.49 (citing Harvey Weinstein et al., 
Protecting the Mentally Disabled, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (May 6, 2001), 
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_06/online_exclusive/654/:pf_printab
le/Template=print?version=1457021888). 
72 Forensic facilities include predominantly those whose residents are primarily those awaiting 
competency to stand trial evaluations, those who have been found incompetent to stand trial and are 
awaiting restoration, those permanently incompetent to stand trial, those awaiting evaluations as to their 
sanity, and those who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, 
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of civilized conduct’,”73 and highlight the dire need for intervention on 
behalf of those with a mental disability who are subjected to such treatment. 
This marginalized and often forgotten population continues to be neglected 
by the very individuals who should be working the most assiduously to end 
such injustices.74  
In some parts of the world, these conditions are fatalistically accepted. 
By way of example, there is a belief that “the right of a psychiatric patient 
to receive modern treatment to alleviate suffering is not something within 
the capacity of most African countries.”75 For example, Uruguayan 
researchers were told by hospital officials that informing patients about their 
treatment would be logistically difficult and would actually worsen the 
patients’ conditions.76 Although the Iron Curtain has long ago fallen, “in 
some countries, prosecutors still enjoy the Stalin-esque power to order 
detention in a psychiatric institution without prior medical opinion.”77   
The literature is robust, and, when read in its entirety, demonstrates 
certain universal factors in the treatment of those institutionalized because 
of mental disability: (1) a lack of comprehensive legislation (in some 
nations, of any legislation) to govern the commitment and treatment of 
persons with mental disabilities;78 (2) a lack of independent counsel made 
available to persons facing commitment and those institutionalized;79 (3) a 
 
 
“Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of 
Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. 
REV. 481, 485 (2008). 
73 Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come,” supra note 38, at 491. 
74 See generally Perlin & Schriver, supra note 9, at 212 (“Articles written by those who self-identify 
with the ‘psychiatric survivor movement’ largely ignore this population as well. So, even within the 
world of those who focus broadly on these human rights issues, this population has remained invisible”). 
75 A. Alem, Human Rights and Psychiatric Care in Africa with Particular Reference to the 
Ethiopian Situation, 101 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 93, 94 (2000), as quoted in Jennifer 
Fischer, A Comparative Look at the Right To Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized Persons 
with a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 183 (2005). 
76 MDRI URUGUAY REPORT, supra note 34, at 20, as quoted in Fischer, supra note 75, at 183-84. 
77 Lewis, supra note 34, at 295, as quoted in Fischer, supra note 75, at 185; see generally Perlin, 
supra note 28. This state behavior is emphatically not just “a thing of the past.” See, e.g., Peter Finn, In 
Russia, Psychiatry Is, Again a Tool Against Dissent, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901592_pf.html. 
78 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 75, at 183; Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to 
Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 325, (2003).  Gerard Quinn, Civil 
Commitment and the Right to Treatment Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1992); Johan Legemaate, Involuntary Admission to a Psychiatric Hospital: Recent 
European Developments, 2 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 15 (1995). 
79 See, e.g., Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human 
Rights Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2004); Rodney 
J. Uphoff, Why In-House Live Client Clinics Won't Work in Romania: Confessions of a Clinician 
Educator, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 315 (1999); Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access 
to Justice in the United States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83 (2000); 
Lewis, supra note 34, at 295-96. 
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failure to provide humane care to institutionalized persons;80 (4) a lack of 
coherent and integrated community programs as an alternative to 
institutional care;81 and (5) a failure to provide humane services to forensic 
patients (those whose involvement in the mental health system was 
triggered by involvement in the criminal justice system).82 
What are the implications of all of this for forensic mental health 
professionals and the forensic mental health professions? To answer this, I 
will first consider the standards of practice as set out by ethical codes of the 
APA and the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law.83 
III. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY’S AND FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY’S NEED TO BE 
MORE INVOLVED IN THESE ISSUES84 
The APA first published an ethical code in 1953.85 Since then, it has been 
regularly revised, and the most recent version was published in 2002.86 In 
this version, the principle of “Justice” is included in the “General 
Principles” section: 
Psychologists recognize that fairness and justice entitle all persons to 
access to and benefit from the contributions of psychology and to 
equal quality in the processes, procedures, and services being 
conducted by psychologists. Psychologists exercise reasonable 
judgment and take precautions to ensure that their potential biases, 
the boundaries of their competence, and the limitations of their 
 
 
80 See, e.g., Perlin, Universal Factors, supra note 30, at 343-49, discussing, inter alia, findings 
reported in AMNESTY INT’L, ROMANIA: MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING INPATIENT 
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT (2004), http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/MemorandumPDF.pdf. 
81 See, e.g., Eric Rosenthal & Arlene S. Kanter, The Right to Community Integration for People 
With Disabilities Under United States and International Law, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 309 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 2002); MDRI 
KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 34; Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: 
Lessons to Learn from the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819 
(2015). 
82 See, e.g., MDRI MEXICO REPORT, supra note 34; Perlin, supra note 3; Perlin & Schriver, supra 
note 9. 
83 For a convenient compendium of all relevant U.S.-based ethical codes, see Kenneth S. Pope, 
Ethical Standards & Practice Guidelines for Assessment, Therapy, Counseling, & Forensic Practice, 
KSPOPE.COM, http://www.kspope.com/ethcodes/index.php. 
84 This section draws, in part, on Michael L. Perlin, “With Faces Hidden While the Walls Were 
Tightening”: Applying International Human Rights Standards to Forensic Psychology, US-CHINA LAW 
REVIEW, Oct. 2010, at 1, 4–5.  
85 See generally ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS (AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 1953). 
86 See ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT (AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N 2002) (amended 2016), http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ethics-code-2017.pdf [hereinafter 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES or EPPCC]. 
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expertise do not lead to or condone unjust practices.87 
This raises a question we cannot escape: to what extent is this “fairness 
and justice” principle truly met internationally?88 
In an effort to “improve the quality of forensic psychological services 
offered to individual clients and the legal system and thereby to enhance 
forensic psychology as a discipline and profession,"89 the Committee on 
Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists of the APA issued Specialty 
Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists (“Specialty Guidelines”) to serve, in 
part, as “an aspirational model for psychologists acting as experts for [and 
working in relationship with] the judicial system.”90 The articulated goals 
of these guidelines are these: 
… to improve the quality of forensic psychological services; enhance 
the practice and facilitate the systematic development of forensic 
psychology; encourage a high level of quality in professional 
practice; and encourage forensic practitioners to acknowledge and 
respect the rights of those they serve. These Guidelines are intended 
for use by psychologists when engaged in the practice of forensic 
psychology as described below and may also provide guidance on 
professional conduct to the legal system, and other organizations and 
professions.91 
These guidelines cover a wide range of behaviors. For example, the 
guidelines on “Competence” require that:  
Forensic psychologists have an obligation to present to the court, 
regarding the specific matters to which they will testify, the 
boundaries of their competence, the factual bases (knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, and education) for their qualification as an 
expert, and the relevance of those factual bases to their qualification 
 
 
87 Id. at at 4. For an important typology of the different sorts of biases demonstrated by expert 
witnesses, see generally Ansar M. Haroun & Grant H. Morris, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Deceptions 
of Psychiatrists, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 227 (1999). I characterize this as “a blueprint for 
understanding the pretextual basis of much expert testimony” in Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked 
Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed 
as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 27–28 (1999).  
88 For the most recent ethical guidelines for forensic psychiatrists, see ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW 2005), 
http://www.aapl.org/docs/pdf/ETHICSGDLNS.pdf [hereinafter AAPL GUIDELINES]. 
89 Specialty Guidelines, supra note 1, at 655. 
90 Alexis Krulish Dowling, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on 
Executing the Mentally Retarded, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 809 (2003). 
91 SPECIALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 1. 
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as an expert on the specific matters at issue.92  
Guidelines on “Relationships” mandate that:   
Forensic psychologists have an obligation to ensure that prospective 
clients are informed of their legal rights with respect to the 
anticipated forensic service, of the purposes of any evaluation, of the 
nature of procedures to be employed, of the intended uses of any 
product of their services, and of the party who has retained the 
forensic psychologist.93 
Finally, in the “Public and Professional Communications” section, the 
guidelines emphasize that forensic psychologists must be “aware that their 
own professional observations, inferences, and conclusions must be 
distinguished from legal facts, opinions, and conclusions.”94 
The Preamble of the far-briefer Guidelines of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and Law (“AAPL Guidelines”) stresses that “[forensic 
psychiatrists] should be bound by underlying ethical principles of respect 
for persons, honesty, justice, and social responsibility,”95 and, subsequently, 
mandates that “[r]espect for the individual's right of privacy and the 
maintenance of confidentiality should be major concerns when performing 
forensic evaluations.”96 These guidelines, however, are in no way as 
detailed or as comprehensive as those drafted by AAPL’s psychological 
counterparts. 
In a careful and comprehensive analysis of the forensic mental health 
assessment procedures, Professor Kirk Heilbrun has identified twenty-nine 
principles of forensic mental health assessment that he grouped according 
to whether they were “established” or “emerging.”97 Heilbrun provides us 
with a carefully established body of proscriptive and prescriptive rules, and 
it can be said with confidence that these rules apply to all forensic 
psychologists who are doing such assessments. The empirical question, 
though, is not answered: do forensic psychologists and psychiatrists follow 
 
 
92 Specialty Guidelines, supra note 1, at 658. Dr. Harold Hall questions whether it is possible “for 
psychologists to perform adversarial evaluations and adhere to the Guidelines, EPPCC and the revised 
testing standards?” E-mail from Dr. Harold Hall to Michael L. Perlin, Professor Emeritus of Law, New 
York Law School (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). He believes that they can, presuming 
“mandatory adherence” to the Guidelines, the EPPCC and the revised standards. Id. 
93 Specialty Guidelines, supra note 1, at 659. 
94 Id. at 665.  
95 AAPL GUIDELINES, supra note 88, at 1. 
96 Id.  
97 Kirk Heilbrun et al., Pragmatic Psychology, Forensic Mental Health Assessment, and the Case 
of Thomas Johnson, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 31, 33 (2004); see KIRK HEILBRUN, PRINCIPLES OF 
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT, at vii (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 2001). 
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these rules in actual practice? And if no, why not? I believe the reasons for 
a negative answer (as in so many other areas of law, policy and behavior) 
can be found in what I refer to as “sanism” and “pretextuality.”98 It is 
particularly nettlesome to see this sanism and pretextuality in practicing 
forensic psychologists. If there is any cohort that should be sanism-and 
pretextuality-free, it should be forensic mental health professionals. Sadly, 
that has not been the case.99 
I am not entirely pessimistic, however. I believe the solution—or at least 
a partial solution—can be found in the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.100 
IV. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE  
For the past twenty-five years, I have been writing incessantly about the 
malignant impact of sanism and of pretextuality: the two corrosive factors 
that contaminate all mental disability law. What do these phrases mean? 
Sanism “is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other 
irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social 
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.”101 It infects 
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.102 Sanism is largely 
invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon 
stereotype, myth, superstition, and de-individualization, and is sustained 
and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense” (“OCS”)103 
 
 
98 See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text (defining and explaining terms “sanism” and 
“pretextuality”). 
99 On sanism in forensic practice in general, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor 
Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental 
Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 226-28, 234-36 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Misdeameanor Outlaw]; 
Michael L. Perlin, “They're an Illusion to Me Now”: Forensic Ethics, Sanism and Pretextuality, in 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: BRIDGING THE GAP 245–249 (David Canter & Rita Žukauskienė eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Illusion to Me]. Forensic psychologists who are employed by state institutions often 
exhibit sanism in their paternalism in their dealings with patients, refusing to acknowledge that they 
must be presumed to be competent to engage in autonomous decision making. See, e.g., Michael L. 
Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’”: Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor 
a Client’s Decision about Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.  73 (2016). 
100 On how therapeutic jurisprudence can be a tool to remediate the “willful blindness” often 
exhibited by both the mental health system and the judiciary in related contexts, see Michael L. Perlin, 
What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 629–30 (1993). 
101 Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 99, at 226–27. 
102 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 
21–58 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 373 (1992). 
103 OCS is a “powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making.” Michael L. Perlin, “She 
Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary 
Common Sense”, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003); see Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and 
Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 737 (1988) 
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and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in 
everyday life and in the legal process.104 
Pretextuality defines the ways in which courts “accept (either implicitly 
or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and 
frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, 
especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort 
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.”105 This pretextuality is 
poisonous. It “infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism 
and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy 
lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt 
testifying.”106  
All aspects of mental disability law are pervaded by sanism and by 
pretextuality, whether the specific presenting topic is involuntary civil 
commitment law, right to refuse treatment law, the sexual rights of persons 
with mental disabilities, or any aspect of the criminal trial process.107 
Together, I believe they help explain the contamination of scholarly 
discourse and of lawyering practices alike.108 Unless and until we come to 
grips with these concepts—and their stranglehold on mental disability law 
development—any efforts at truly understanding this area of the law, or at 
understanding the relationship between law and psychology, are doomed to 
failure.109 
In other works, I have tackled the question of the relationship between 
sanism and ethics of the forensic mental health professions (specifically, 
psychology and psychiatry) in the context of clinical evaluations and court 
testimony.110 In that context, I argued that, to a great extent, sanism is a 
disease of attitudes.111 We generalize about persons with mental disabilities, 
 
 
(OCS exemplified by the attitude of “[w]hat I know is ‘self-evident’; it is ‘what everybody knows’”). 
104 Perlin, supra note 103, at 24–25. 
105 Id. at 25. For a stark example of this in the context of capital punishment, see generally Perlin, 
Your Corrupt Ways, supra note 39. 
106 Perlin, supra note 103, at 25. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 26. 
109 Id. at 26–27. 
110 See generally Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 99; Perlin, Illusion to Me, supra note 
99. I have also considered this question directly in radically different substantive contexts in, inter alia, 
Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense 
Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996), in Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons 
with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15 (1993), and in Michael 
L. Perlin, “Everything's a Little Upside Down, as a Matter of Fact the Wheels Have Stopped”: The 
Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 239 (2004). 
111 Perlin, On “Sanism,” supra note 102, at 377–78; Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in 
Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 117-120 (1991). For a more recent 
reconsideration, see generally Michael L. Perlin, “My Sense of Humanity Has Gone Down the Drain”: 
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stereotype them, typify them, and “slot” their behavior, and by focusing on 
alleged “‘differentness,’ we deny their basic humanity and their shared 
physical, emotional, and spiritual needs.”112 When we engage in this 
generalization, we are doing two things: 
[W]e are distancing ourselves from mentally disabled persons—the 
“them” —and we are simultaneously trying to construct an 
impregnable borderline between “us” and “them,” both to protect 
ourselves and to dehumanize what Sander Gilman calls “the Other.” 
The label of “sickness” reassures us that “the Other” —seen as “both 
ill and infectious, both damaged and damaging” not like us and 
further animates our “keen . . . desire to separate ‘us’ and ‘them.’”113 
There is no longer any question that such attitudes infect decision-
making by judges and by jurors:114 on what grounds should we assume that 
they are somehow strangely absent in the reports and testimony of experts? 
Personal bias appears to be “inescapable”, unless and until we come to 
grip with its underlying causes.115  Dr. Joel Dvoskin has perceptively noted, 
in this context: “[j]udgments about groups of people can only lead to stigma 
and discrimination, while judgments about individuals if based on reason 
and information, can lead to better treatment outcomes and increased safety 
for the individuals and their communities.” 116 
The roots of sanism are deep. From the beginning of recorded history, 
mental illness has been inextricably linked to sin, evil, God’s punishment, 
crime, and demons.117 Evil spirits were commonly relied upon to explain 
 
 
Stereotypes, Stigma and Sanism, in STEREOTYPES AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 95–117 (Eva Brems & 
Alexandra Timmer eds., 2016). 
112 Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last 
Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 537 (1993). 
113 See Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability 
Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 787 (1998) (discussing 
SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND 
MADNESS 130 (1985)).       
114 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994).  
115 Ellen Chun, Book Note, Falling Between the Cracks, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 395, 408 
(1997) (discussing Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 630 (1993)). On the possible linkages between intellectual disability and sin, see, 
e.g., Eman Gaad, Cross-Cultural Perspectives on the Effect of Cultural Attitudes Towards Inclusion for 
Children with Intellectual Disabilities, 8 INT’L J. INCLUSIVE EDUC. 311 (2004); Sushila Edwardraj et al., 
Perceptions about Intellectual Disability: A Qualitative Study from Vellore, South India, 54 J. INTELL. 
DISABILITY RES. 736 (2010); Ram Lakhan & Manoi Sharma, Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) 
Survey of Families Toward Their Children with Intellectual Disability in Barwani, India, 21 ASIA PAC. 
DISABILITY REHAB. J. 101 (2010).  
116 Hava B. Villaverde, Racism in the Insanity Defense, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 209, 246 (1995).  
117 See, e.g., JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 26-
27 (1967) (explaining that insanity was tied to sin, and a special class of priests were the only people 
capable of ridding the sinner of his demonic possession); WOLF WOLFENSBERGER ET AL., THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss1/6
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abnormal behavior.118 The “face of madness has haunted the imagination of 
Western man.” 119 People with mental illness were considered beasts; a 
person who lost his capacity to reason was seen as having lost his claim “to 
be treated as a human being.”120 
It goes without saying that this is depressing on multiple levels. 
Fortunately, I believe there is a remedy that we can embrace. That is one of 
the most important legal theoretical developments of the past twenty-five 
plus years—the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence 
(“TJ”).121 
Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact 
of case law and legislation. As a therapeutic agent, the law can have 
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.122 Therapeutic jurisprudence 
asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be 
reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential without subordinating due 
process principles.123 David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent 
 
 
PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES 12-25 (1972) (noting that mental retardation [now, 
intellectual disability] has often been regarded as the result of sin and God's punishment). See generally 
JUDITH S. NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS (1975). 
118 See, e.g., Richard Gardner, Mind over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity 
Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 677 (2000) (stating that 
“[t]reatment for mental illnesses ranged from exorcism to even more bizarre and often inhumane 
practices, such as torture or the removal of portions of the skull to allow evil spirits to escape”). 
119 MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF 
REASON 15 (Richard Howard trans., 1965). 
120 Perlin, On “Sanism,” supra note 102, at 388, citing, inter alia, BIGGS, supra note 117; WALTER 
BROMBERG, FROM SHAMAN TO PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS 63-64 (1975); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 
64-65 (1984); NEAMAN, supra note 117, at 31, 50, and 144.   
121 The following section is partially adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the 
Wasteland of Your Mind”: Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. 
L. 304 (2016). It also distills the work the author has done on this topic for the past two decades plus, 
beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, supra note 100.  
122 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC 
AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 59, § 2-6. Wexler first used 
the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, 
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
27, 32-33 (1992). See also, Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: 
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.  
885, 912 (2009); Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Petersen eds., 2006) (for a 
discussion from a transnational perspective). 
123 Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot 
Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability 
Law Policing Rape, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 431, 434 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best 
Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right 
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tension of this inquiry must be resolved: the law’s use of “mental health 
information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon 
justice concerns.”124 “[A]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean 
that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”125 
Using TJ, we “look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”126 and 
assess law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.127 
One governing TJ principle is that “law should value psychological health, 
should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should 
attempt to bring about healing and wellness.”128 One of the central principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence thus is a commitment to dignity. 129 Therapeutic 
jurisprudence allows us to gain “a new and distinctive perspective utilizing 
socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications.”130  It has 
been described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law…a 
movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of 
law…which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial 
 
 
to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005). On how therapeutic jurisprudence 
“might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist 
façade,’” see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession's Willful and 
Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) [hereinafter 
Perlin, Mirror].  
124 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship, 11 
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 17, 21 (1993). See also, e.g., David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 
APPLIED & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).  
125 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000) (emphases omitted); 
Perlin, supra note 113, at 782. 
126 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims 
of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).  
127 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Dennis 
P. Stolle et al., 2006) [hereinafter PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE].  
128 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY 
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL 
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
129 See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 
(2005). See generally Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Defying Madness: Rethinking 
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2015). 
130  Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and 
Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008). It is also part of a growing comprehensive 
movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling 
legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 127, at 465. 
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triumphalism.”131  In doing this, it supports an ethic of care.132 
With regard to the three prime ingredients of a therapeutic experience, 
“three Vs”: voice, validation and voluntariness.133 Professor Amy Ronner 
argues: what “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a 
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that 
litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken 
seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When 
litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and 
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation 
create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the 
part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that 
engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their 
own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the 
future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are 
making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.134 
After studying the 3Vs in the context of, inter alia, forced drugging of 
incompetent patients,135 “scarlet letter” punishments,136 preventing sex 
offender recidivism,137 competence to engage in voluntary sexual 
interaction,138 granting individuals with mental disability autonomy in legal 
 
 
131 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & 
MED. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also, Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: 
Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A 
HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use 
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 
13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006). The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982).  
132 See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 131, at 605-07; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party 
Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns about Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra note 
131. 
133 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the 
importance of “voice,” see also, Freckelton, supra note 130, at 588. 
134 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002); See generally, AMY D. 
RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).  
135 Perlin & Schriver, supra note 3, at 401-02. 
136 Michael L. Perlin & Naomi Westein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: 
Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 SO. CAL. REV. L. & SOC'L JUST. 1 (2014).  
137 Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2012); MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION (2017). 
138 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 3, at 278-79; MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, 
DISABILITY AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016). 
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decision making,139 and access to problem-solving courts,140 I concluded 
that the adoption of the therapeutic jurisprudence principles set forth above 
would promote the “true therapeutic process” argued by Professor Ronner. 
The questions are then: do the behavior of the APA and the continuing 
inaction of forensic psychologists comport with TJ principles? Does it 
enhance the likelihood that persons in psychiatric institutions—especially 
forensic institutions—will be validated, have voice, or feel as if they are 
acting voluntarily? What, then, can and should forensic psychologists do to 
remediate this situation? I believe that the answer encompasses 
requirements on both forensic witnesses and forensic researchers. And the 
application of international human rights law here—specifically, the 
CRPD—is entirely consonant with TJ values.141  
I add here a personal note. I litigated for thirteen years before I became 
a law professor—as a Deputy Public Defender and the Director of the New 
Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy. I spent many years as a law 
professor, directing a clinic in which our students represented persons with 
mental and physical disabilities. I have also served as a consultant in many 
forensic cases. In these contexts, I have dealt with dozens and dozens of 
expert witnesses in matters involving the rights of persons with mental 
disabilities in individual and class action cases. 142 I have also done countless 
 
 
139 Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 99. 
140 Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went Off to War”: Considering Veterans Courts as Problem-
Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 445, 455-56 (2013); Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, “Life’s 
Hurried Tangled Road”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Why Dedicated Counsel Must Be 
Assigned to Represent Persons with Mental Disabilities in Community Settings, 35 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
353 (2017)); Perlin & Gallagher, supra note 56; See also, Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, 
“They’re Planting Stories in the Press”: The Impact of Media Distortions on Sex Offender Law and 
Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 243 (2013). 
141 See PERLIN, supra note 4, at 215 (“The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities . 
. . is a document that resonates with TJ values”). On the relationship between international human rights 
and therapeutic jurisprudence in general, see Winick, supra note 58, at 572: “the remedy for the abuses 
in the mental health system of Hungary and other Eastern European nations is a healthy dose of 
international human rights law and therapeutic jurisprudence.” In a manuscript in progress, I am 
exploring the relationship between the CRPD, therapeutic jurisprudence and trauma. See Mehgan 
Gallagher & Michael L. Perlin, “The Pain I Rise Above”: How International Human Rights Can Best 
Realize the Needs of Persons with Trauma-Related Mental Disabilities (on file with author). I also 
believe the application of international human rights law in this context is entirely consonant with 
procedural justice values. See Perlin, supra note 8, at 1188. “Procedural justice” asserts that “people’s 
evaluations of the resolution of a dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system) are 
influenced more by their perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief regarding 
whether the ‘right’ outcome was reached.” Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Forging Links and Renewing 
Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal 
Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 200 (2012). On procedural justice in the 
context of mental disability law, see, e.g., Sumner J. Sydeman et al., Procedural Justice in the Context 
of Civil Commitment: A Critique of Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 207, 216 n.49 (1997). 
142 As a Deputy Public Defender in New Jersey, I filed a class action suit Dixon v. Cahill, No. 
L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reprinted in PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 59, § 
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site-visits to psychiatric institutions and to institutions for persons with 
intellectual disabilities domestically and internationally.143 I have taught 
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists in my multiple mental disability 
law courses at New York Law School for over thirty years, and continue to 
teach them now through continuing education programs.144 I believe these 
experiences have given me a relatively comprehensive picture of what 
psychiatric institutions are like, and how forensic mental health 
professionals in these facilities work. Beginning with the baseline that 
“human rights—including the underlying value of autonomy—should 
inform correctional practice and forensic psychology,”145 these experiences 
have led me to three major conclusions.  
First, I believe that witnesses must take seriously the conditions of the 
institutions they visit, even if the sole purpose of their visit is to assess 
committability, competency or insanity. Beyond these examples, I believe 
that this must be done whether the institution is a civil psychiatric facility, 
a forensic facility, a jail, or a prison. In coming to their expert conclusions 
about whether an individual meets the statutory standards for commitment, 
or whether the individual is competent to stand trial, or whether the 
individual meets the standards for insanity, or whether the mental status 
should be raised as a potential mitigating factor in a death penalty case, the 
witness must consider the impact that institutional conditions have on her 
ultimate conclusion, and—in the appropriate situation—must address these 
squarely in her report. My experiences have demonstrated to me that what 
currently is done by psychologists is insufficient. I thus offer a list of means 
(by no means exclusive) by which forensic psychologists might ameliorate 
this state of affairs in a proper way: 146  
 
 
19-8 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (applying Due Process Clause to incompetent-to-
stand-trial defendants)), resulting in a ruling that the indefinite incarceration of individuals in the Vroom 
Building (NJ’s maximum security facility for the “criminally insane” violated Jackson, and ordered 
individual hearings for each inmate. The courts ultimately found that 185 of the 225 patients in that 
facility were illegally detained). See Michael L. Perlin, “May He Stay Forever Young”: Robert Sadoff 
and the History of Mental Health Law, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 236-37 (2005). 
143 Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come,” supra note 38, at 485. 
144 See, e.g., CONCEPT PROF’L TRAINING, CONCEPT Offers New Course by Michael Perlin and 
Heather Cucolo, http://www.concept-ce.com/concept-welcomes-new-collaboration-with-mental-
disability-law-and-policy-associates (last visited Oct. 20, 2017); GLOB. INST. OF FORENSIC RESEARCH, 
Who We Are, https://www.gifrinc.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2017). I also present regularly at the Practical 
Applications in Forensic Psychiatry Grand Rounds Seminar, University of Pennsylvania, Department of 
Psychiatry, and at the Forensic Fellowship Program, Albert Einstein College of Medicine. 
145 Michael S. King, New Directions in the Courts’ Response to Drug and Alcohol Related Legal 
Problems: Interdisciplinary Collaboration and Collaboration with Defendants, 6 PHX. L. REV. 917, 925 
(2003) (citing Ward & Birgden, supra note 12, and Birgden & Perlin, supra note 12). 
146 By way of example, for a compendium of proposed principles that provide guidance to 
correctional system administrators to enable forensic disability clients’ access to available rehabilitation 
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• Attend trainings on international human rights law and policy;   
• Stay abreast of international and regional court interpretations 
of human rights norms; 
• Visit institutional facilities that are largely in compliance with 
such norms to get a sense as to what institutional behavioral 
changes are feasible; 
• Create “best practice manuals”147 for approaches to treating 
patients in accordance with human rights;  
• Become active “whistleblowers”148 and report human rights 
violations to the relevant human rights commissions and 
NGOs;  
• Authentically hold each other accountable to take 
responsibility for human rights violations; 
• Advocate for better outpatient services to provide for the sort 
of less restrictive treatment alternatives that international law 
demands;149 and 
• Self-assess so as to best insure that sanism and pretexutality do 
not unduly influence the treatment of forensic patients, and 
incorporate principles of therapeutic jurisprudence into their 
daily institutional work, keeping in mind professor Ronner’s 
“three Vs” of voice, validation and voluntariness.150 
Second, forensic psychologists should follow the lead of lawyers and 
 
 
programs, see Astrid Birgden, Enabling the Disabled: A Proposed Framework to Reduce Discrimination 
Against Forensic Disability Clients Requiring Access to Programs in Prison, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE 
L. REV. 637, 694-96 (2016). 
147 See, e.g., Risa E. Kaufman, State and Local Commissions as Sites for Domestic Human Rights 
Implementation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 89, 101-04 
(Shareen Hertel & Kathryn Libal eds., 2011). 
148 In a related context, see James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationship between Human Rights 
and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 125, 150 (2009), discussing how the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption requires that states enact whistleblower laws to ensure the protection of those who 
come forward and expose governmental corruption. The failure to enact such laws leaves “witnesses and 
victims unprotected [, which] encourages corrupt practices and impunity, and discourages witnesses 
from fulfilling a public responsibility.” Id. at 150 n.87. On how economically and politically 
disenfranchised groups—and forensic patients are classic examples of such disenfranchised groups—
disproportionately suffer from the effects of corruption, see Id. at 148. 
149 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sur. Ct. 2012) (holding 
that substantive due process requirement of adherence to principal of least restrictive alternative applied 
to guardianships sought for mentally persons, relying in part on the language of the CRPD), discussed 
in Perlin &. Schriver, supra note 3, at 387-88. 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 133-134. 
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provide pro bono services151 to NGOs, disability rights organizations, and 
other offices that provide legal representation to these populations in 
systemic law reform litigation, both domestically and internationally. They 
should also make their services available to groups doing other sorts of 
institutional law reform.152 
Third, researchers should bore down and focus on the conditions of 
confinement of forensic patients. Consider the range of issues crying out for 
greater consideration: 
• Evaluation of the proposition that it is more cost-effective for 
governments to provide for outpatient services rather than 
keep people unnecessarily institutionalized; 
• Evaluation of the proposition that treating people in 
accordance with the principles espoused by therapeutic 
jurisprudence—focusing again on Professor Ronner’s “three 
Vs” of voice, validation and voluntariness153—will lead to 
greater treatment adherence on the part of patients, whether 
they have been committed voluntarily or involuntarily; 
• Analysis of the extent to which state and local departments of 
mental health adhere to U.S. constitutional and statutory law 
(in the context both of the Americans with Disabilities Act154 
and the Supreme Court’s “integration mandate” decision of 
Olmstead v. L.C.155) and international human rights law (in 
the context of the CRPD)156 in providing restoration to 
competency to stand trial and post-insanity acquittal 
treatment services in the community, rather than in 
maximum security forensic hospitals;157 and 
• Consideration of the extent to which certain forensic decision-
 
 
151 This includes (but is not limited to) the evaluations of indigent patients, working with lawyers 
to help them understand psychological nuance, and the conducting of site-visits in institutions. 
152 See, e.g., Perlin, Promoting Social Change, supra note 56; Perlin & Gallagher, supra note 56; 
Perlin et al., supra note 56; Michael L. Perlin & Yoshikazu Ikehara, Creation of a Disability Rights 
Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific: Its Impact on China? (2011), (New York Law School Legal Studies, 
Research Paper Series 10/11 #19), http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1744196.   
153 See Ronner, supra note 134, at 94-95. 
154 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2009). 
155 527 U.S. 581 (1999). See generally Perlin, supra note 6; Samuel Bagenstos, The Past and 
Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012). 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 44-56. 
157 See Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 99, for an outline of this argument. 
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making reflects the implicit bias158 of xenophobia in its 
refusal to acknowledge the relevance of international human 
rights law to institutional decision-making. 159 
I am aware that this is no easy task. Psychologists may be pressured by 
correctional organizations to engage in practices that violate the APA Ethics 
Code, in inflicting physical or psychological harm on an offender in the 
quest to meet organizational requirements for safety and community 
protection (a schemata in which the organization is the client and the 
offender is a means to an ends). In such circumstances, the psychologist will 
have to choose between ethical action (refusing to comply and reporting) or 
unethical inaction (complying and failing to report).160 But I believe that 
international human rights laws demand a different response.  
V. CONCLUSION: A CHALLENGE  
The revelations of what happened in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib 
led to a sober and careful examination by organized psychology (and 
psychiatry) into the role of mental health professionals in certain military 
operations. The denouement of these revelations led to inquiries into the 
relationship between what some psychologists and psychiatrists did and 
international human rights standards. Activists, advocates and scholars 
have, in recent years, been bringing their focus to bear on the relationship 
between international human rights and how individuals are treated in 
psychiatric institutions around the world. Ethical codes mandate that 
forensic psychologists and forensic psychiatrists behave to ensure that they 
maximize the values of “fairness and justice” in their dealings with 
clients.161 Complicating this entire state of affairs is the contaminating 
influence of the way that sanism and pretextuality affect professionals’ 
dealings with persons with mental disabilities.  
I titled this subsection of my paper “A challenge,” because I believe that 
all of this does present a challenge to concerned psychologists and 
psychiatrists whose professional work is connected to what goes on in the 
 
 
158 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); L. Elizabeth Sarine, Regulating the Social Pollution of 
Systemic Discrimination Caused by Implicit Bias, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2012). 
159 My special thanks to Mehgan Gallagher, Debbie Dorfman and Naomi Weinstein for many of 
the thoughts and suggestions in this section of the paper. 
160 Astrid Birgden, The American Psychological Association’s Misuse of the Role of Psychologist-
as-Organizational-Consultant to Torture: Where Was the “Bright Line” Position?, in THE WILEY 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (D. Polaschek, A. Day & C. Hollin eds., 
2017) (forthcoming). 
161 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 86, at 4. 
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legal system. It is a challenge because we must remain vigilant in light of 
the shock-the-conscience state of so many institutions around the world,162 
and because it is essential that mental health professionals involve 
themselves in efforts to rectify the violations of international human rights 
law that are omnipresent in so many of those institutions, especially in those 
cases where being passive about those violations also violates ethical codes. 
The disclosures of what happened at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib have 
opened a window that will not, and cannot, be closed.163  
But, I believe we can learn from our mistakes, and take that knowledge 
and apply it to the issue that is the centerpiece of this paper: the need for 
organized psychology—especially forensic psychology—to embrace 
international human rights requirements applicable to the 
institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities, especially forensic 
patients.164 In doing so, organized psychology will take a major step in 
“strip[ping] bare the sanist façade”165 of the institutions. 
The critic Paul Williams calls The Times They Are A-Changin’ a song 
that is “generous, evangelical, eager to share the truth with the whole 
world.”166 The line that I chose to begin the title of this paper—"Your Old 
Road Is/ Rapidly Agin'"—was a challenge by the then twenty-two-year-old 
Dylan to authority figures at all levels of society, a challenge he issued in 
1963, at one of the most tumultuous times of American history. We face a 
time of challenge and tumult now. I believe that if we heed Dylan’s 
challenge, we will be taking a major step in the right direction down a new 
road.  
 
 
 
162 See Perlin, “A Change is Gonna Come,” supra note 38, at 491. The phrase comes from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). 
163 For a rare scholarly work that cites to the therapeutic jurisprudence literature in this context, 
see Jordan J. Paust, The Bush-Cheney Legacy: Serial Torture and Forced Disappearance in Manifest 
Violation of Global Human Rights Law, 18 BARRY L. REV. 61, 62 n.2 (2012). 
164 It is also essential that this be done within the context of therapeutic jurisprudence. See Birgden 
& Perlin, supra note 12 (noting how little attention has been paid to the impact of therapeutic 
jurisprudence on questions of international human rights law and the role of forensic psychologists). 
165 Perlin, Mirror, supra note 123. 
166 PAUL WILLIAMS, BOB DYLAN, PERFORMING ARTIST, 1960-1973: THE EARLY YEARS 93 
(2004). 
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